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EFFICIENCY REJECTED: EVALUATING
"UNDUE HARDSHIP" CLAIMS UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Gregory S. Crespi"

I.

INTRODUCTION

Major pieces of civil rights legislation are expressions of fundamental and partially conflicting social aspirations. Such statutes emerge from
a process of negotiation and compromise which tends to subsume rather
than resolve tensions among competing normative principles. The hard
choices which must be made between conflicting claims of right are consequently often left for subsequent administrative or judicial action.
An example of this is provided by the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 19901 ("ADA"), signed into law by President Bush on July 26,
1990. The employment-related provisions of the ADA reflect a tension
between the statute's goal of enhancing the occupational civil rights of
disabled persons, and the sometimes conflicting goals of limiting intrusion upon the rights of their employers, and of making efficient use of
t Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law. J.D., Yale University
(1985); Ph.D., University of Iowa (1978); M.S., George Washington University (1974); B.S., Michigan
State University (1969). I would like to thank Carol Kitti, Sue Nordberg, Dick Schmalensee, Charles
Terry and John Wodatch for their assistance and comments on drafts of this article. I would also
like to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Anthony Kronman and Arthur Leff, whose insightful
analyses of the limitations of the efficiency paradigm inspired this article and guided its development.
1. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
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economic resources. The resolution of these conflicts under specific factual circumstances will have to be achieved through Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations and judicial decisions.
This article will attempt to provide guidance for administrative officials
and judges to assist them in this effort.
The ADA broadly extends the scope of the federal civil rights protections against discrimination on the basis of disability. Such protections were first provided by the Rehabilitation Act of 19732
("Rehabilitation Act"), but only with regard to certain federally-funded
entities or activities.3 The ADA, however, when fully implemented will
essentially extend the duties imposed by the Rehabilitation Act to most
employers,4 and to most providers of public accommodations and operators of commercial facilities,5 broadly defined, transportation,6 and telecommunications relay services. 7
The ADA's employment provisions are particularly significant because of their broad coverage, their application to existing facilities as
well as to new construction or major renovations, 8 and their limitation by
a balancing test.9 Those provisions impose upon covered employers not
only a prohibition of discrimination against disabled employees or job
applicants, but also the affirmative obligation to make "reasonable accommodations" of facilities and procedures to accommodate the special
needs of disabled employees or job applicants. 10 The ADA further provides, however, that an employer need not make a particular accommodation, even though it be a reasonable one, if to do so would impose an
"undue hardship" on the operation of its business." The term "undue
hardship" is broadly defined by the ADA to mean "significant difficulty
or expense," and a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in determining its presence or absence is provided, 2 but the statute does
not
specify the relative weights to be given to each of the listed factors or to
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
3. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act covers Federal contractors or subcontractors having
contracts in excess of $2,500. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988). Section 504 covers programs conducted by a
Federal executive agency or by the U.S. Postal Service, and programs or agencies that receive Federal financial assistance' 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
4. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101(2), (5), 102(a) (1990).
5. Id. at §§ 301(2), (7), 302(a), 303(a).
6. Id. at §§ 201-205, 221-22, 241-246, 304.
7. Id. at § 401.
8. Id. at § 101(9), 102(b)(5).
9. Id. at § 102(a), (b)(5).
10. Id. at § 102(b)(5).

11. Id.
12. Id. at § 101(10).
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competing concerns in making this determination. The ADA will consequently require the EEOC-the agency directed by the ADA to issue
regulations to implement the employment provisions-and the courts to
engage in subjective difficult balancing analyses to determine whether the
defense should be available under specific factual circumstances.
The ADA's open-ended undue hardship defense provisions thus
constitute an invitation to regulators and judges to impose their values in
the disability rights context. One significant decision those persons will

have to make in applying those provisions concerns the relative importance of promoting efficient resource allocation, as against the need to

achieve other social objectives. There has emerged in recent decades an
influential group of commentators who have argued that it should be a

significant-if not over-riding-goal of our political and legal system to
encourage economic efficiency, in the sense of facilitating the flow of resources and outputs to their highest valued uses.13 These claims have

sparked substantial controversy regarding whether there is an adequate
normative basis for regarding economic efficiency as a desirable social

goal and, if so, how that goal is to be traded-off against, or integrated
with, other social objectives. 4 Some of this debate has dealt at least
tangentially with the role of efficiency considerations in making disability

accommodation determinations."5 The debate is not confined to
academia, but also has taken place among policy makers. Both the internal Bush Administration deliberations concerning the proper response to
the initial Senate Labor and Human Relations Committee version of the

ADA and the subsequent negotiations between the Administration and
that Committee which led to substantial amendment of that initial draft

involved considerable discussion of the proper role of economic efficiency
13. This group of commentators is commonly labeled the "law and economics" movement, and
has its modern origins in the writings of Guido Calabresi and Ronald Coase in the early 1960's. See,
e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499 (1961);
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 . L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For a general exposition of the efficiency orientation presented in terms consistent with the views shared by many (but not all) members of that group, see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, (3rd Ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER].
14. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 3-26; Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
191 (1980) [hereinafter Dworkin]; Kronman, Wealth Maximization As A Normative Principle, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980) [hereinafter Kronman]; Leff, Economic Analysis of Law, Some Realism
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451(1974) [hereinafter Leff]; and a number of articles contained
in a Hofsta Law Review symposium and in a subsequent response issue published at 8 HoFSRA L.
REv. 485-972 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Note, Employment DiscriminationAgainst the Handicappedand Section 504 of the
RehabilitationAcL An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARv. L. REv. 997, 1012-15 (1984); Note,
Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaningof DiscriminationUnder Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881, 901 n. 106 (1980).
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concerns in deteimining the availability of the undue hardship defense. 16
This is an important question. The cost to ADA-covered employers
of making the required "reasonable accommodations" could be as great
as several billion dollars annually,1 7 and the total cost could be sharply
affected by the ease of availability of the undue hardship defense. If efficiency criteria are given significant weight in making undue hardship determinations, this could often lead to very different outcomes than those
that would result if only the "deep pocket"-oriented undue hardship factors expressly listed by the ADA are taken into account in making those
determinations. Efficiency considerations would tend to broaden the
availability of the defense under those circumstances where the expected
benefits of an accommodation are small relative to its cost, but would
work to restrict its availability in instances where its expected benefits are
large relative to its cost. Conversely, when viewed from the efficiencyoriented perspective, if the availability of the undue hardship defense is
predicated primarily upon a showing of a lack of financial capability,
rather than upon a showing of the inefficiency of an accommodation, the
defense can be either over- or under-inclusive, depending upon the
circumstances.
This article will focus on the question of the proper weight to be
given economic efficiency concerns by the EEOC in its regulations and
by judges when conducting the undue hardship balancing tests. It will be
argued that the language of the statute, its legislative history, and the
inapplicability in the disability employment accommodation context of
the key premises underlying the efficiency orientation all indicate that
little if any weight should be given to efficiency considerations in determining the availability of the undue hardship defense for ADA-covered
employers.
The remainder of this article is presented in four additional Parts.
16. The author participated in these internal Administration deliberations and subsequent negotiations with Congress in his dual role as Senior Counsel and Senior Staff Economist for Law and

Economics for the Council of Economic Advisers, Executive Office of the President, during the
spring and summer of 1989.
17. There is substantial uncertainty regarding the costs of the accommodations required by the
ADA. See GAO, PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: REPORTS ON COSTS OF ACCOMMODATIONS, GAO

Briefing Report GAO/H.R. Doc. No. 90-44 BR, 101st Cong. (1990). A Council of Economic Advisers study prepared during the spring of 1989 for use in internal Bush Administration deliberations
estimated that the accessibility, auxiliary aids, and administrative costs alone that the employment
provisions of the ADA would impose upon employers with 15 or more employees would range between $1.7 and $10.2 billion annually. See ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION OPTIONS, Council of Economic Advisers Memorandum for the Domestic Policy
Council Working Group on Americans With Disabilities, at Attachment A, page 5 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author, June 14, 1989).
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Part II will discuss the general features of the efficiency orientation, and
will present an overview of how the ADA might be conceptually regarded as at least partially a vehicle for giving effect to economic efficiency concerns in the disability employment accommodation context.
Part III will examine the text of the relevant ADA employment provisions and their legislative history, and will develop the thesis that Congress has all but ruled out the use of efficiency considerations in
determining the availability of the undue hardship defense, and has made
reasonably clear that primary emphasis is to be placed on the cost of an
accommodation relative to the employer's financial capability. Part IV
will examine in some detail how premises and assumptions underlying
the efficiency orientation might be applied in the disability employment
accommodation context. That Part will argue that even if the statutory
provisions governing this defense are interpreted to allow some weight to
be given to efficiency concerns, as a matter of law, federal regulators and
the courts still should choose not to do so as a matter of policy, since the
premises and assumptions which must be satisfied for economic efficiency
to have normative significance are not met in the disability employment
accommodation context. Part V will summarize and generalize the conclusions reached in this article.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE EFFICIENCY ORIENTATION AND ITS

APPLICATION TO THE DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT
ACCOMMODATION CONTEXT

The economic efficiency orientation provides a perspective from
which legal rules are evaluated by the standard of whether they are
wealth-maximizing, or at least wealth-enhancing, where wealth is defined
as the aggregation of social valuations as measured by willingness to pay.
Stated in non-technical terms, a law is efficiency-enhancing to the extent
that it facilitates the allocation of resources and outputs to their highest
valued uses. More precisely, a law is efficient if it allows a set of economic actors with particular initial resource endowments to interact so
as to maximize their aggregate wealth, subject to the resource and technology constraints they individually and collectively face.
Proponents of the efficiency orientation, as a general matter, are
predisposed to disfavor governmental intervention into market processes.
It can easily be shown that a set of perfectly competitive markets will
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facilitate efficient, wealth-maximizing transactions among the participants in those markets."8 Under conditions of perfect competition, such
transactions will occur and will take place costlessly among fully informed parties, all costs and benefits will be internalized, and efficiency
cannot be further enhanced by laws that compel particular
transactions.19
In the real world, however, market transactions take place at a cost
to participants, and have external impacts upon non-participants. The
market participants must first acquire information concerning the markets for the items traded and for related items, and concerning the circumstances facing those persons similarly situated and those on the other
side of those markets. They must then engage in negotiations with those
other parties concerning quantities, prices, payment systems, and mechanisms to internalize positive and (if required by law) negative externalities. These costs for a particular mutually advantageous transaction may
exceed the increase in wealth that will result for the participants. If so,
that transaction will not take place, and the market is said to "fail." A
rule of law which imposes upon two or more parties the duty to engage in
a mutually advantageous transaction which otherwise would not have
taken place, because of high transaction costs, will correct that market
failure and increase the wealth of each of those parties without reducing
the wealth of any other parties (assuming that no other persons are adversely affected by the transaction, and that adoption and enforcement of
the rule is essentially costless), and will thus enhance efficiency. For adherents of the efficiency orientation, such a law is a good law, despite its
coercive aspects.
It is certainly possible to characterize the ADA's reasonable accommodation/undue hardship employment provisions as rules at least partially intended to enhance efficiency by correcting such market failures,
and to argue that they should be implemented with this goal in mind.
Under this characterization, the relevant "market" is the locus of decisions concerning which particular "reasonable accommodations" will be
provided by employers for disabled employees and job applicants. The
"buyers" of these accommodations are those disabled employees and applicants that believe they have a positive probability of benefiting from
them at some point in time, and those other members of the public who
18. See, e.g., Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a PotentiallyDefective Product: A Buyer's Guide to
Posner'sEconomic Analysis of Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1655, 1665-69 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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perceive that they will also derive some expected benefit from those accommodations, either because of a possibility of being benefitted as customers or employers of accommodated disabled workers, or because of a
perceived possibility of themselves becoming disabled, or for purely altruistic reasons. The "sellers" of those accommodations are the employers who are required by the ADA to provide those accommodations if
they are not unduly burdensome.2 0 The market for reasonable accommodations has "failed" because the costs of conducting informed negotiations between an employer who is being asked to make a particular
reasonable accommodation and all of the persons who expect to benefit
from that accommodation, and of designing and implementing mechanisms for excluding non-payers from the benefits of that accommodation
are, in many instances, so large as to exceed the aggregate benefits that
would result had all the affected parties been able to agree on the accommodation measure, a mechanism for excluding non-payers, and a corresponding set of payments that would together produce expected net gains
for ll.2 1
The ADA employment provisions can consequently be regarded as
a relatively inexpensive substitute for such negotiations and payment
mechanisms which will arguably remedy the market failure, enhance
economic efficiency and increase total social wealth if they are interpreted to require employers to make a reasonable accommodation if and
only if its aggregate benefits exceed its cost. Where the cost of an accommodation exceeds its benefits, however, the employer should be able,
under this interpretation of the purposes of the ADA, to invoke the undue hardship defense to avoid making the accommodation, since otherwise an inefficient activity will take place which will reduce total wealth.
The question explored by this article is whether it is appropriate for
EEOC and the courts to accept the above characterization of the ADA's
employment provisions as intended at least partially as a means to cure
market failures, and consequently implement them in a manner intended
to achieve a more efficient resource allocation. I will argue that it is more
appropriate to reject that characterization and instead interpret and apply those provisions so as to enhance the occupational rights of disabled
individuals without regard to economic efficiency consequences. The
20. The "seller" group might also include the small group of misanthropic persons who feel
they derive some benefit from non-accommodation of disabled potential employees. It is an open
question whether misanthropic preferences should be accorded weight in determining the efficiency
of social arrangements.
21. Including, perhaps, the misanthropes.
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next part of this article will attempt to demonstrate that Congress intended that regulators and the courts apply this latter interpretation.

III. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADA
A.

The Relevant Text

Title I of the ADA covers employment relationships. 22 Section
102(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities.2 3 Under Section 102(b)(5)(A), the term "discriminate" includes:
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity .... 24

The term "reasonable accommodation" is defined at Section 101(9)
to include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.25

The term "undue hardship" is defined and a relevant factor list provided at Section 101(10):
(A) IN GENERAL. - The term "undue hardship" means an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light
of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).
(B) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED. - In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered en-

tity, factors to be considered include (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
22. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101-106, 104 Stat. 327, 330337 (1990).
23. Id. at § 102(a).
24. Id. at § 102(b)(5)(A).
25. Id. at § 101(9).
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number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its
facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in
question to the covered entity.2 6

The undue hardship definition and factor list, while it does not specify economic efficiency to be a relevant factor, does not expressly preclude consideration of efficiency consequences. According to the
statutory text, the factors to be considered in making an undue hardship
determination "include" the nature and cost of the accommodation
sought, the financial resources and number of employees of the relevant
facility and entity, the financial and other impacts of the accommodation
upon the facility, the overall size and other characteristics of the entity's
business, and the composition and structure of its workforce. Those particular factors do not suffice for making judgments as to the efficiency of
an accommodation; such a determination would also require information
concerning the size of the resulting benefits. Since the specified list of
factors is not expressly made exclusive, however, there is some room to
argue that other factors not listed and relevant to efficiency consequences
may also be considered. The statutory language mandating consideration of several factors that are irrelevant to an efficiency determination
(such as the size of the facility's financial resources), however, suggests
that economic efficiency considerations are regarded by Congress as, at
most, one of several competing concerns to be balanced.
While the undue hardship definition and relevant factor list leaves
the role of efficiency consequences somewhat unclear, ADA Section
501(a), in terse fashion appears to constrain the role of efficiency concerns
in at least some of the undue burden determinations called for by the
ADA to be no greater than the limited role those concerns have played in
the jurisprudence interpreting the comparably-worded Federal agency
regulations implementing Sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.2 7 Section 501(a) of the ADA states the following:
26. Id. at § 101(10).
27. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
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Except as otherwise provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title."
The meanings of Sections 101(10) and 501(a) are made more transparent by their legislative history, as will be discussed below.
B.

The Legislative History
1. Congressional Action on the ADA

Since the early 1980's Congress has been presented with studies and
testimony arguing that current Federal and state laws are inadequate to
address the problems of discrimination faced by persons with disabilities.29 The introduction of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988
(S. 2345) led to further joint House-Senate subcommittee hearings on
these issues, but the bill failed to win passage.30 President Bush, in his
1988 campaign, took a strong stand in favor of a "mainstreaning" approach involving expanded civil rights protections for the disabled. In
1989, the past year's disability legislation was reintroduced in the Senate
in substantially similar form as S. 933, and was referred to the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Relations. Following further hearings
and extensive negotiations with representatives of the Bush Administration, S. 933 was favorably reported out of this Committee in substantially
amended form by a 16-0 vote on August 2, 1989.31 It subsequently passed
the Senate without amendment on September 6, 1989, by a vote of 76 to
8, with 16 abstentions.3 2
After Senate passage S. 933 was introduced into the House of Representatives as H.R. 2273, and was subsequently referred to each of the
four House committees having jurisdiction over one or more of the areas
covered by the legislation. After each of these committees passed the bill
with minor amendments,3 3 the House Rules Committee ironed out minor
28.
(1990).
29.
30.
31.
32.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 501(a), 104 Stat. 327, 369
S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 1.
135 Cong. Rec. S10,803 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989).

33. The House Education and Labor Committee was the first of these committees to act, approving a slightly amended version of H.R. 2273 on November 14, 1989 by a 35-0 vote. 8 BNA Emp.

Rel. Weekly 71 (January 15, 1990). The House Energy and Commerce Committee followed with a 403 approval vote of its version on March 13, 1990. 8 BNA Emp. Rel. Weekly 357 (March 19, 1990).
The House Public Works and Transportation Committee gave its version of the legislation its endorsement by a 45-5 vote on April 3,1990. 8 BNA Emp. Rel. Weekly 581 (May 7, 1990). The House
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differences in the committee versions and sent the bill to the House floor,
where on May 22, 1990 it was overwhelmingly approved by a vote of 40320. 3 ' A joint House-Senate conference committee subsequently reconciled the two versions of the ADA, 35 and the conference committee draft
was approved by the House on July 12, 1990,36 and by the Senate on July
13, 1990." 7 The bill was signed into law by President Bush on July 26,
1990.38
2.

Interpreting Certain Ambiguities of the ADA in Light of Its
Legislative History

The text of the ADA, as noted above in Part III.A., is ambiguous in
at least two ways with regard to the availability and application of the
undue hardship defense. First, it is not entirely clear from the text of
ADA Section 501(a) whether its prohibition against use of a lesser standard of coverage than set forth by the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations is intended to apply only when the ADA is enforced
against persons already covered by the Rehabilitation Act. If so, this
would allow use of a lesser standard of coverage for employers not subject to the Rehabilitation Act. It may be, however, that this prohibition
is intended to apply more broadly to all ADA enforcement efforts.
The language of Section 501(a) does not preclude the former interpretation, which would allow the undue hardship defense to be made
more easily available to employers first covered by the ADA than to employers already subject to the Rehabilitation Act. One argument for
such an interpretation of Section 501(a) is based upon the recognition
that the Rehabilitation Act, at least in theory if not always as a practical
matter, is for many employers an "opt-out" statute that they can elect to
avoid by declining Federal funds. This opt-out feature allows these employers to avoid incurring accommodation costs they perceive as excessive without having to undergo the risks of litigation of the undue
Judiciary Committee followed suit on May 2, 1990 by a 33-3 vote. 8 BNA Emp. Rel. Weekly 587
(May 7, 1990).
34. 8 BNA Emp. Rel. Weekly 677 (May 28, 1990).
35. The joint conference committee accepted language contained in the House version of the
bill in 79 of the 81 instances in which the House and Senate versions differed. 8 BNA Emp. ReL.
Weekly 837 (July 2, 1990). The House versions of the undue hardship definition and factor list were
accepted in lieu of the different but substantively very similar Senate versions.
36. 8 BNA Emp. Rel. Weekly 901 (July 16, 1990).
37. Id.
38. 8 BNA Emp. Rel. Weekly 965 (July 30, 1990).
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hardship issue under that statute and its implementing regulations. Accommodation measures which are perceived by employers as excessively
costly are likely, in many instances, to also be inefficient, although there
is no necessary correlation between high costs and inefficiency. The Rehabilitation Act's opt-out feature thus acts as a crude sort of efficiency
check on the accommodations it requires.
The ADA, in contrast, does not allow employers to opt out from its
coverage, and its undue hardship defense is consequently more crucial to
some employers than is the comparable defense provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, from an efficiency-oriented perspective, it may be advisable to allow a more liberal use of the
undue hardship defense under the ADA than under the Rehabilitation
Act, at least with regard to inefficient accommodation measures. Under
the logic of this view, however, the defense should be more liberally
available under the ADA than under the Rehabilitation Act for all
ADA-covered firms, since no opting out is possible, and not merely to
those firms not previously subject to the Rehabilitation Act requirements. This position, however, is inconsistent with the text of ADA Section 501(a), which at the least expressly prevents any relaxation of
coverage standards for firms subject to the Rehabilitation Act. This inconsistency indicates that the rationale of the opt-out argument for relaxed ADA standards was not implicitly embraced by Congress when
adopting that Section.
A second possible basis for interpreting Section 501(a) to allow for
differential availability or application of the undue hardship defense for
different classes of employers, based upon their Rehabilitation Act coverage status, is the argument that efficiency criteria are more appropriate
standards for guiding the conduct of wholly private employers than for
the conduct of those public or (at least partially) publicly-funded employers subject to the Rehabilitation Act. From this perspective, economic
criteria should be given less weight when scrutinizing the activities of
public or publicly-funded entities that are often trying to advance a broad
set of social policies, some of which are not readily susceptible to evaluation in economic terms, than when evaluating the actions of more narrowly economically-oriented, purely private entities. This could be
accomplished by giving more weight to efficiency concerns when applying the ADA to newly-covered employers than when applying it to Rehabilitation Act-covered entities, a practice arguably consistent with the
text of Section 501(a).
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These arguments for incorporating either lesser or differential undue
hardship standards into the ADA were discussed during the intense negotiations between the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and members of the Bush Administration prior to its original
1989 Senate passage. They ultimately proved to be unpersuasive; the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources Committee Report
("Committee Report") on the original Senate version of S. 933 clearly
shows that the Committee (and, subsequently, the adopting Congress)
implicitly rejected those arguments and intended that a uniform standard
of coverage identical to that developed under the Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence be applied to all ADA-covered employers:
"[The term "undue hardship"] is derived from and should be applied
consistently with interpretations by Federal agencies applying the term
set forth in regulations implementing sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." 39
The second major ambiguity of the ADA's employment provisions
noted above in Part III.A. derives from the failure to specify the relative
weight to be accorded to efficiency concerns as compared to other factors
in making undue hardship determinations. The very comprehensive and
heavily negotiated 4° Committee Report, however, goes on to discuss the
application of the undue hardship defense factors in a fashion which
makes clear the Committee's intent to carry forward into the ADA's employment provisions, and apply to all classes of employers, the "deep
pocket"-oriented regulatory standards developed under the Rehabilitation Act:
The weight given to each factor in making the determination as to
whether a reasonable accommodation nonetheless constitutes an "undue hardship" will vary depending on the facts of a particular situation
and turns on both the nature and cost of the accommodation in relation to the employer's resources and operations. In explaining the
"undue hardship" provision, the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare explained in the appendix accompanying the [Rehabilitation Act] section 504 regulations (42 Fed. Reg. 22676 et. seq, May 4,
1977):
Thus, a small day-care center might not be required to expend more than a nominal sum, such as that necessary to
39. S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1989).
40. See supra note 16.
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equip a telephone for use by a secretary with impaired hearing, but a large school district might be required to make
available a teacher's aide to a blind applicant for a teaching
job. Further, it might be considered reasonable to require a
State welfare agency to accommodate a deaf employee by
providing an interpreter, while it would constitute an undue
hardship to impose that requirement on a provider of foster
home care services.
The mere fact that an employer is a large entity for the purposes of
factor (1), should not be construed to negate the importance 4of
1 factors
(2) and (3) in determining the existence of undue hardship.
The Senate floor debate preceding passage of S. 933 indicates that
the entire Senate understood that the ADA's reasonable accommodation/undue hardship provisions were intended to codify the Rehabilitation Act regulations and jurisprudence on these questions. Senator
Harkin, in reporting out S. 933 from the Senate Labor and Human Relations Committee, stated that this legislation:
[A]dopts many standards and interpretations from the original HEW
regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
including the obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation unless
it would result in an undue hardship. 4 2
In response to a question from Senator Helms as to when the costs
of a reasonable accommodation would rise to the level of an undue hardship, Senator Harkin read to him portions of the above-quoted language43 from the Report. He also made the following statement in
response to another very similar question from Senator Helms:
What I presume you mean is, if a blind person came in for a job, and
said "You must provide a reader for me." Well, if I had Tom Harkin's
pharmacy out in Adel, Iowa, I could not afford that. That would
probably be an undue hardship so I would not have to do that. On the
other hand,
if it was IBM, maybe that would be something that could
44
be done.
This quote further indicates that Senator Harkin had embraced the
ADA's incorporation of the "deep pocket"-oriented undue hardship factors given primary weight by the Rehabilitation Act regulations and jurisprudence (as will be discussed below). There were comments made on
the Senate floor by both Senators Helms and Humphrey that indicated
41.
42.
43.
44.

S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 36 (1989).
135 Cong. Rec. S10,714 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
135 Cong. Rec. S10,773 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989).
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their concerns that the ADA's undue hardship criteria were vague and
would provoke considerable litigation,4 5 but neither comment suggested
that they regarded the ADA provisions as anything other than codifications of the Rehabilitation Act standards.
The undue hardship definition and factor list ultimately adopted by
the ADA differ slightly from the definition and factor list contained in
the original Senate version of S. 933 and discussed in the accompanying
Committee Report and subsequent floor debate.' However, the changes
made to those provisions are without substantive impact, and there is no
indication in the legislative history that they were intended to alter the
original thrust of S. 933 to carry forward the undue hardship jurisprudence developed under the Rehabilitation Act.
C. Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct
It is thus clear that Congress intended that the ADA's undue hardship defense be interpreted and applied to all employers in a manner consistent with the federal agency regulations that provide employers with
an undue hardship defense under the Rehabilitation Act. An examination of the Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence reveals that little if any
weight has been given to efficiency concerns in undue hardship determinations made pursuant to those regulations.
1. Legitimacy of the Rehabilitation Act's Regulations' Undue
Hardship Defenses and Relevant Factor Lists
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is couched in general terms
and does not specifically provide for an undue hardship defense. That
statute prohibits the exclusion of "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons, by reason of a handicap, "from the participation in. . .any program
45. Id. at S10,773, S10,783.
46. The original Senate version of S.933 contained the following language corresponding to
Section 101(10) of the final version of the ADA:
(A) In general. - The term "undue hardship" means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.
(B) Determination. - In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be. considered include(i)the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of employees, number and type of facilities, and the size of the
budget;
(ii) the type of operation maintained by the covered entity, including the
composition and structure of the workforce of such entity; and
(iii) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act.
S.Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. 35-36 (1989). The final version differs primarily in the greater
emphasis placed upon the characteristics of the specific facility to be modified.
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or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or.. .any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency," as well as the denial of the
"benefits" of such programs or activities, and any "discrimination" in
such programs. 47 This statute as originally adopted did not contain any
provisions calling for Federal agencies to promulgate implementing regulations. 4 However, on April 28, 1976, President Ford issued Executive
Order No. 11,914, 4 9 directing the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to co-ordinate the implementation of Section 504 by the various federal departments and agencies. The lead agencies responsible for
enforcing that law-initially the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS))
and subsequently the Department of Justice (DOJ)-and numerous
other federal agencies subsequently promulgated such regulations, and
their right to do so has never been seriously challenged.
The HHS Section 504 regulations, adopted in 1977,50 state in Subpart B dealing with employment practices that a recipient of Federal financial assistance "shall make reasonable accommodation" to otherwise
qualified handicapped employees or applicants unless that accommodation "would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.", 51 These HHS regulations were the genesis of the undue hardship
concept and language. The regulations went on to state:
In determining pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section whether an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
a recipient's program, factors to be considered include:
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number
of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the composition
and structure of the recipient's workforce; and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.5 2
This undue hardship defense and list of relevant factors provided the
basis for comparable regulations issued by a number of other Federal
agencies, 5 3 including the DOJ,54 and for the language now incorporated
by the employment provisions of the ADA.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
48. The Rehabilitation Act was subsequently amended in 1978 to require Federal agencies to

promulgate such regulations as necessary to implement the amendments made to it by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
49. 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
50. 45 C.F.R. Part 84 (adopted April 28, 1977).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1990).
52. Id. at § 84.12(c).
53. See, ag., 5 C.F.R. §§ 900, 701-710 (1990) (Office of Public Management); 7 C.F.R. §§ 15 b.l-
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The Supreme Court initially construed Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis.5" The issue in Davis was the meaning of the term
"otherwise qualified handicapped person" in the employment context,
and the case did not squarely present the question of the legitimacy of
imposing affirmative employer obligations or making available an undue
hardship defense. That opinion contained dicta, however, which suggested that affirmative obligations could not be imposed upon employers
by regulation if those obligations resulted in "undue financial and administrative burdens." 6 Subsequent to the Davis holding, at least two circuit
courts have applied this limitation upon a showing that one of the two
"undue burdens" there mentioned would be created as a result of the
accommodation sought under Section 504.11
In 1984, the DOJ issued additional regulations implementing Section
504 for its internally-funded activities which stated that an "undue burden" defense was broadly available to entities even outside of the employment context covered by the HHS regulations and other federal
regulations allowing the undue hardship defense." Those DOJ regulations consequently provoked controversy, and were defended as consistent with and mandated by the position taken by the Supreme Court in
Davis and by subsequent lower court decisions in the employment context.5 9 This controversy, however, relates only to the availability of an
undue burden defense outside of the employment context, and not to the
applicability of that defense (or, equivalently, the undue hardship defense) with regard to employer accommodations, which is generally
accepted.
The Supreme Court, in 1985, revisited Section 504 in Alexander v.
Choate,' another employment case, stating that "while a grantee need
not be required to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to
accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make 'reasonable'
.42 (1990) (Department of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. §§ 4.101-.233 (1990) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 10 C.F.R. §§ 1040.61-.74 (1990) (Department of Energy); 13 C.F.R. §§ 113.1-.8 (1990) (Small
Business Administration); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1251.100-.400 (1990) (National Aeronautics and Space Administration); 15 C.F.R. §§ 8 b.1-.25 (1990) (Department of Commerce).
54. 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.501-.540 (1990).
55. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
56. Id. at 412.
57. Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2nd Cir. 1982); APTA v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C.

Cir. 1981).
58. 28 C.F.R. Part 39 (adopted Sept. 11,1984).
59. Id. at "Supplementary Information."
60. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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ones. ' 6 1 In 1987, in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,62 a Florida
case involving employment accommodations under Section 504, the
Supreme Court opinion included a long footnote endorsing use of the
undue hardship defense, and use of the factors listed in the HHS regulations as relevant to determining the availability of that defense. 63 It is
thus clear that the undue hardship defense and list of relevant factors
now is regarded as a legitimate implementation of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, at least in the employment context.
2.

Application of the Undue Hardship Defense Under The
Rehabilitation Act

Since the ADA text and legislative history clearly call for implementation of the undue hardship defense in parallel fashion with the application of that defense under the Rehabilitation Act Section 504 regulations,
it is necessary to examine the Rehabilitation Act undue hardship cases to
determine the relative weight to be given each of the relevant factors.
None of the above-cited Supreme Court cases have involved a balancing
of the factors listed in the regulations as relevant for an undue hardship
determination. Several circuit courts, however, have conducted such a
balancing analysis, at least in abbreviated fashion.
In APTA v. Lewis", the issue was the validity of Department of
Transportation regulations implementing Section 504 in the public
transit context. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals there cited Davis as
establishing the "undue financial and administrative burdens" criteria for
determining the limits of the Section 504 requirements, and applied that
criteria to strike down those regulations solely because of the large financial burdens they imposed:
Applying these standards to public transit, we note that at some point
a transit system's refusal to take modest, affirmative steps to accommodate handicapped persons might well violate Section 504. But DOT's
rules do not mandate only modest expenditures. The regulations require extensive modifications of existing systems and impose extremely
heavy financial burdens on local transit authorities.. .The regulations
themselves recognize that some changes will be "extraordinarily expensive.. ." These are the kind of burdensome modifications that the
61. Id. at 300.
62. 480 U.S. 273 (1985), reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024, on remand 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla.

1988).
63. Id. 288 n. 17.
64. 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Davis Court held to be beyond the scope of section 504.65
The APTA court did not engage in the comparison of accommodation costs with the size of the resulting benefits that would be necessary
to give weight to efficiency considerations in its analysis.
In Dopico v. Goldschmidt,66 a case also involving Section 504 claims
in the public transit context, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for evaluation of the transit systems' undue hardship claims,
stating that with regard to the degree of accommodations required under
Section 504, courts were "bounded [sic], after Davis, by a general proscription against 'massive' expenditures., 67 The opinion contained no
language stating that "massiveness" was to be defined with reference to
the size of resulting benefits, as an efficiency orientation would suggest to
be appropriate.
In Treadwell v. Alexander68 at issue was the duty of the Army Corps
of Engineers to restructure the allocation of employee job duties so that a
person handicapped by heart and nervous conditions could serve as a
seasonal park technician. The district court had previously concluded
that it would have been necessary for the Corps to require other park
technicians to perform many of the plaintiff's duties had he been hired,
and that this would have been unduly burdensome to the Corps, given
the fact that only two to four other Corps workers would be available at
any given time to perform all necessary duties in the particular 150,000
acre park involved, and given the limited resources available to the
Corps. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court
opinion, without citing any need for consideration of the size of the benefits to the plaintiff had he been accommodated.
The history of Rhode Island Handicapped Action Committee v.
Rhode Island Public Transit Authority,69 another public transit case,
shows with unusual clarity the judicial reluctance to incorporate efficiency criteria into the reasonable accommodation/undue hardship analysis. The plaintiffs there challenged several actions of the defendant
transit agency as violative of its Section 504 duty to accommodate the
disabled. The district court applied the efficiency criterion in its analysis,
although it did not label it as such:
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1278 (footnotes omitted).
687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 653.
707 F.2d 473 01th Cir. 1983).
549 F.Supp. 592 (D.R.I. 1982), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 718 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 1983).
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This inquiry necessarily involves balancing the overall costs and benefits, both long and short range, that the relief would confer on both the
plaintiff and the defendant. If the overall costs are reasonable in light
of the anticipated benefits, and the burdens imposed are not 'undue,'
then.. .relief should be granted .... 70
The district court later in its opinion made clear that efficiency was
not the sole criterion considered in the determination, and that it was
relevant only in the assessment of the necessity for making accommodations that were already found to not impose "massive" costs upon the
employer:
Section 504 requires neither 'massive' expenditures nor modifications
that would result in 'undue' administrative burdens... Thus, even if the
benefit to the handicapped of a modification to an existing transportation system would be substantial, § 504 does not require that it be instituted if doing so would jeopardize the effectiveness of that
transportation system in any serious way.71
The district court, however, reemphasized the importance of efficiency criteria for determinations made within the "massive" expenditure constraint:
The cost of remedying the discrimination [in this instance] against the
handicapped simply cannot be called 'massive' or 'undue'.. . therefore
hold that RIPTA shall purchase the 42 buses complete with wheelchair lifts... [T]he cost of $139 per bus for the 42 new buses about to be
purchased is insubstantial when compared to the benefit of having
those buses equipped with two bays. .. The Court does not believe,
however, that the cost of retrofitting the 34 buses
purchased in 1981
justifies the expense of $1,200 plus labor per bus. 72
The district court consequently conditioned the requirement to provide accommodations (in the non-massive expenditure context) on satisfaction of cost/benefit criteria which approximate the efficiency standard.
However, this efficiency-oriented approach was subsequently rejected by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed the lower court: 73
The cost-benefit test articulated by the district court does not provide
the type of predictable standard upon which courts and administrators
can rely to prevent judgments from being mere personal predilections.
The suggested test requires a balancing of costs and benefits: if the
overall costs seem to the court reasonable in light of the anticipated
70.
71.
72.
73.

549 F.Supp. at 607.
549 F.Supp. at 610-611 (footnotes omitted).
549 F.Supp. at 614.
718 F.2d 490 (Ist Cir. 1983).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss1/1

20

1990]

Crespi: Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims under the A
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

benefits, and the financial and administrative burdens seem not undue,
then a failure to make a particular purchase will constitute 'discrimination' prohibited by section 504.. .While we agree that it is a desirable
goal to help the handicapped become active in the social, economic,
and political affairs of the community, we are at a loss to place a price
tag or value on such participation .... The absence of hard data in this
case forced the district court to offer an educated guess as to where the
balance of costs and benefits should lie.... under this test it would
remain uncertain whether the next purchase of buses should include
chairlifts, and if so, how many.
.. We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred in ordering atfarmative relief based on its own cost-benefit analysis...74
What was rejected in Rhode Island Action Committee, strictly
speaking, was not the use of a cost/benefit framework to ascertain the
contours of the undue hardship defense, but instead the more restricted
use of cost/benefit criteria to determine the reasonableness of measures
that did not require such massive expenditures as to be unduly burdensome. However, the criticisms of the cost/benefit framework articulated
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in this opinion are as applicable to
use of those criteria to draw the undue hardship line as they are to determine "reasonableness" within that limit.
There is one circuit court case that provides slender support for use
of efficiency criteria in ascertaining the existence of an undue hardship.
In New Mexico Association for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico", the
plaintiffs sought to require the State of New Mexico to provide certain
special education services for handicapped children. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated in dictum:
Such accommodation is required only when it does not generate undue
financial or administrative hardship.... In this regard, it seems apparent under [Davis] ... that the greater the number of children needing
the particular special education service, the more likely that failure to
provide the service constitutes discrimination. This is so because the
more children in need 76
of the service, the more the benefits of that service outweigh its cost.
The most comprehensive judicial analysis to date regarding the application of the undue hardship criteria under Section 504 is presented in
Nelson v. Thornburgh, 7 a district court case from the Third Circuit. In
74. Id. at 498-99.
75. 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 854.
77. 567 F.Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983) aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1188 (1985).
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that action, several blind plaintiffs sought to require the Department of
Public Welfare of the State of Pennsylvania to hire part-time readers so
that they could adequately perform their duties as income maintenance
workers for that Department. The district court estimated that the cost
of each part-time reader for each plaintiff would be approximately $6,600
per year; about 30% of the $21,000 annual salary paid to a typical
plaintiff.
In analyzing the availability of the undue hardship defense, the
court first quoted the HHS regulations' list of factors to be considered,
and then quoted the following portion of Appendix A to the HHS
regulations:
The weight given to each of these factors in making the determination
as to whether an accommodation constitutes undue hardship will vary
depending on the facts of a particular situation. Thus, a small day-care
center might not be required to expend more than a nominalsum, such
as that necessary to equip a telephone for use by a secretary with impaired hearing, but a large school district might be required to make
available a teacher's aide to a blind applicantfor a teachingjob. Further, it might be considered reasonable to require a state welfare agency
to accommodate a deaf employee by providing an interpreter while it
would constitute an undue hardship to impose that requirement on a
provider offoster home care services.78
Having given special emphasis to the "deep pocket" factors listed in
the HHS regulations, the court proceeded to compare the cost of providing part-time readers to the $300 million annual budget of the Department, and not surprisingly concluded that the cost of readers did not
impose an undue hardship. 79 The court did offer some dicta which suggests that it might approve of the application of cost/benefit criteria
where such criteria pointed towards requiring certain accommodations:
[T]he additional dollar burden [of paying for part-time readers] is a
minute fraction of the [Department's] personnel budgets. Moreover,
in enacting section 504, Congress recognized that failure to accommodate handicapped individuals also imposes real costs upon American
society and the American economy .... When one considers the social
costs which would flow from the exclusion of persons such as plaintiffs
from the pursuit of their profession, the modest cost of accommodation-a cost which seems likely to diminish, as technology advances
and proliferates-seems, by comparison, quite small."0
78. Id. at 380.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 382 (footnote omitted).
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The opinion, however, offers no support for the application of cost/
benefit or efficiency criteria where they would favor allowing use of the
undue hardship defense.
A review of the case law applying the undue hardship defense under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act thus reveals that there is very little
support for giving weight to efficiency criteria. The thrust of those cases
is clearly to implement the "deep pocket" policy articulated by the HIIS
regulations' factor list and Appendix thereto. That policy indicates that
a reasonable accommodation must be made, regardless of the size of benefits that will result, so long as the cost of the accommodation is not
unduly large relative to the overall financial capacity of the employer.
D. Summary
The legislative history of the ADA makes clear the Congressional
intent that the undue hardship defense be uniformly applied to all employers in the same fashion and with the same standards as has been the
comparable defense available under the Rehabilitation Act regulations.
The case law articulating those regulations almost completely rejects the
use of efficiency criteria as a relevant factor in making undue hardship
determinations. Consequently, it appears that the ADA undue hardship
defense should be interpreted so as to give primary emphasis to the deep
pocket oriented factors expressly listed in the statute, and that little, if
any, weight should be given to efficiency concerns.
IV.
THE PREMISES AND ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE
EFFICIENCY ORIENTATION AS APPLIED IN THE DISABILITY
EMPLOYMENT ACCOMMODATION CONTEXT

Even if the ADA's employment provisions are interpreted to allow
EEOC and the courts, as a matter of law, to give some weight to efficiency concerns, there remains the question whether it is wise social policy for them to do so. It will be argued in this Part that the premises
underlying the economic efficiency orientation are not satisfied in the disability employment accommodation context, and consequently no weight
should be given to efficiency concerns by regulators and judges, even if
the statute is interpreted to permit them to do so.
There are a number of normative premises and behavioral assumptions implicit in the belief that economic efficiency is a legitimate social
goal of at least instrumental value, and that such efficiency is best obtained through market or market-simulating mechanisms. The key
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premises and assumptions are: the appropriateness of the use of a will-

ingness to pay measure of value; the assumption of rational behavior; the
appropriateness of the use of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion rather
than the more stringent Pareto criterion; and the assumption that adequate data will be available to establish the relevant magnitudes needed
for an efficiency determination.8 1 Each of these premises or assumptions
will be examined below to demonstrate their implausibility in the disabil-

ity employment accommodation context.
A.

The Willingness to Pay Measure of Value

The devotees of the economic efficiency orientation take the crucial
initial step needed to allow them to ascribe normative value to laws on
the basis that those laws enhance efficiency when they postulate an ultimate measure of social desirability-labeled "value"-and then define

the measure of the value of any item as the largest amount of money
anyone would pay for it (or, alternatively, the amount of money its
owner would have to be paid to part with it willingly).82 "Wealth" is
defined as the aggregation of individual valuations.8" Money is thus

made the measure of all things; wealth is defined as the highest social end
81. There are other assumptions implicit in the use of the economic efficiency standard that
may not always be satisfied, and that if not met will result in that criterion having undesirable
properties. One such assumption is that persons will put the same value on items whether they are
selling them or purchasing them. If, however, persons value items more if they already have them
than if they are purchasing them, thus exhibiting an "irrational" attachment to current possessions
(which may, however, be quite rational given wealth effects; see Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and
Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1357-59 (1986);
Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 64849 (1980)), then it is possible that a
shift from resource allocation A to resource allocation B, as well as a reverse shift from resource
allocation B to resource allocation A, will each be wealth-reducing and consequently inefficient.
This potential property of the efficiency criterion is known as "path-dependence" and is regarded as
undesirable. See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 192; Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory,
and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 678-685, (1979). If, alternatively,
persons value goods more highly when they are purchasing them than when they already have them
(perhaps due to an "irrational" envy effect), application of the efficiency criterion could lead to an
oscillation between two resource allocations, with each shift enhancing efficiency, given the changes
in valuations that result. See Dworkin, supra note 14, at 192; Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Proposition in Economics, 9 REv. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941). Cyclicity is a highly undesirable property for an
evaluative criteria. Another implicit assumption is that increasing efficiency in one micro-context
will enhance efficiency globally. It has, however, been demonstrated that this will not always be the
case, depending on the pattern of inefficiencies existing elsewhere in the economy. See Rizzo, The
Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFSRA L. REv. 641, 652-53 (1980); Lipsey &. Lancaster, The General
Theory of the Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. ll (1957). Most critics of the efficiency criterion,
however, have based their attacks upon the shortcomings inherent in the premises and assumptions
discussed in the text, perhaps because the other assumptions referred to in this footnote appear
relatively plausible in at least some important contexts in which the efficiency criterion is applied.

82.
83.

POSNER, supra note 13, at 11;POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) at 60-61.
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since it is the aggregation of all value, and nothing has any value except
insofar as it is so characterized by a person willing to pay that sum. This
principle of defining value as based exclusively upon the interaction of
human desires and financial capabilities has been insightfully described
by Arthur Leff as "the neo-Panglossian move"" made by law-and-economics writers to avoid having to grapple seriously with the fundamental
philosophical question of what constitutes value.
The raison d'etre of the efficiency orientation is that efficient laws
will maximize aggregate social wealth. The appeal of the economic efficiency orientation consequently hinges upon the acceptance of the proposition that wealth, so defined, is something that we should seek to
maximize through our social arrangements. This proposition has long
been subjected to two severe criticisms. The first major objection is that
there may in fact exist objective standards of value independent of personal preferences that are capable of human cognizance and that should
be taken into account in determining value. 5 Under the willingness to
pay theory of value such objective standards are given force only to the
extent they are incorporated into valuations made by people with means.
Moreover, to the extent that such standards cannot be expressed in monetary terms they will not be reflected at all in valuations. Similarly, any
personal preferences that cannot be reduced to monetary equivalents will
be ignored in value calculations.86
The standard rejoinder to these kinds of objections, of course, is that
there is unfortunately no consensus on how to definitively determine the
nature of these objective standards, if indeed they exist at all, and the best
way to proceed under the circumstances is to embrace the working assumption that all values are ultimately subjective, and can be adequately
expressed in monetary terms, and to allow each person to determine
what is valuable and act accordingly, so long as he or she engages in
mutually advantageous exchange relationships rather than coercive behavior.8 7 In effect, it is conceded that the use of an efficiency standard
represents the abandonment of the seemingly futile effort to ascertain objectively valid principles of valuation or quantify non-economic preferences. Some commentators nevertheless find the abandonment of the
84. Leff, supra note 14, at 456.
85. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 14, at 455-56; Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses
of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L. Rv.307, 311 (1979).

86. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 641, 648-49 (1980).
87. See generally Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.LEGAL STUD. 103

(1979).
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quest for objective standards wrong or at least premature, and on this
account accord no normative authority to the efficiency criterion. 8
A second and perhaps even more troubling objection to the willingness to pay measure of value is that the values persons assign to items are
crucially dependent upon their initial endowments.89 In a market system, prices and resource allocations are determined by the interaction of
these endowment-based personal valuation structures, and can be
crudely but fairly accurately described as being established through a
continuing "one dollar, one vote" referendum. A market system in
which the initial endowments are highly concentrated may result in a
radically different structure of personal valuations, prices, and resource
allocations than will an otherwise identical system that is characterized
by a level distribution of initial endowments. As a consequence, a set of
laws may result in a resource allocation that is relatively efficient with
respect to the structure of personal valuations arising from the existing
distribution of initial endowments, but that may be inefficient-perhaps
highly so-with respect to the structure of personal valuations that
would arise from a different distribution of initial endowments. To the
extent one harbors reservations about the legitimacy of use of the existing
distribution of initial endowments as a normative baseline for resource
allocation decisions, one should be hesitant to embrace an evaluative criteria that endorses a legal rule solely on the basis that it maximizes
wealth in relation to the structure of personal valuations arising out of
the suspect initial distribution.9"
The fact that a resource allocation that is efficient with regard to the
existing distribution of initial endowments will be, in general, inefficient
with respect to any other initial distribution is a serious problem that
sharply limits the appeal of efficiency as a normative standard. 91 One
defense that can be offered in favor of the efficiency orientation is the
argument that there exists no consensus on what changes in the distribution of initial endowments would be desirable, if any, and that, in lieu of
such a consensus, the only practical default assumption is to assume the
existing initial distribution is an appropriate normative baseline for measuring efficiency. This defense, however, is at bottom unresponsive to
88. See generally Dworkin, supra note 14; Kromnan, supra note 14.
89. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 14, at 240; Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cmi. L. REv. 307, 311 (1979).
90. Kronman, supra note 89, at 240.
91. POSNER, supra note 13, at 13.
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criticisms that the efficiency approach cannot generate evaluative standards unless its baseline structure of initial endowments and personal
valuations can first be justified on normative grounds.
These criticisms of the use of a willingness to pay measure of value
appear intuitively to have particular force in the disability employment
accommodation context. One suspects that among those persons who
believe that there are objective standards of valuation independent of personal preferences, a significant proportion also believe that such standards have implications for the valuation of conduct intended to enhance
basic civil rights, and that such standards perhaps cannot be adequately
expressed through monetary measures. One also suspects that among
those persons who would favor a distribution of initial endowments that
differs from the existing distribution, a significant proportion would favor
reallocations which would increase the aggregate wealth of disabled persons, 92 and consequently would also increase the aggregate willingness to
pay for disability employment accommodations (under the plausible assumption that such accommodations are a "normal" good in economic
terms). As a result, it is likely that a goodly proportion of those persons
who, for one reason or another, harbor reservations about the normative
significance of an efficiency standard that is based on a willingness to pay
theory of valuation would be particularly reluctant to endorse the application of that standard in this context. While the merits of these reservations certainly cannot be established by counting noses, the fact that such
reservations are likely to be fairly widely shared is a datum that should
not be disregarded by those responsible for deciding how great an emphasis should be placed upon efficiency concerns.
B.

The Assumption of RationalBehavior

The economic efficiency orientation also incorporates the conventional microeconomic assumption that persons act as rational maximizers of their self-interest, however they define it. If one believes, however,
that irrational economic behavior is widespread and cumulatively significant, one will have reservations about attempting to maximize wealth
through use or simulation of market mechanisms, even absent concerns
about the legitimacy of defining efficiency with regard to a valuation
structure based upon the willingness to pay measure of value.
92. Since disabled persons, as a class, have below-average wealth and incomes, and consequently face a greater-than-average probability of being reduced to pauperhood, measures which
tend to increase their aggregate wealth would likely be supported both by Rawlsians and by persons
who favor more egalitarian wealth distributions, among others.
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The behavioral assumption of rationality is unfortunately tautological and non-falsifiable under conventional economic measurement techniques because an actor's actual market behavior is the only observable
factor regarded as relevant, and the unobservable underlying structure of
valuation is inferred from that behavior under an assumption of rationality. The behavior is therefore by definition rationally consistent with
those inferred valuations. A falsifiable (and consequently meaningful)
statement of the rationality assumption would assert that individuals act
to maximize their self-interests with those self-interests being defined by
some criteria independent of the behavior to be evaluated for its rationality.93 For example, the defining criteria might be a person's own articulation of where his self-interests lie, or such an articulation modified to
take into account psychological or sociological factors that distort articulations or perceived preferences away from "true" self-interests. 94 An
assumption of rationality stated this way would be amenable, at least in
theory, to empirical testing through comparison of self-interests, so defined, with actual market behavior. Unfortunately, there is no consensus
on how to measure a person's "true" self-interests independent of his
actual market behavior, and therefore there is no accepted empirical test
of the rationality hypothesis. There is not even agreement on how to
conceptualize the boundaries of the entity whose self-interests are to be
ascertained independent of his actual market behavior. For example, is
the "self" to be equated with the conscious ego alone, or should unconscious drives which are known to strongly shape behavior also be taken
into account in some fashion in defining the limits of the "self" and its
corresponding interests?9" If so, how is this to be done?
It is thus merely an article of faith that persons rationally act in
accord with some meaningful definition of their self-interest. That faith
underlies the assumption that perfectly competitive markets will generate
efficient outcomes, and that laws which mandate mutually, desired market transactions that would otherwise be prevented by high transactions
costs will consequently enhance efficiency. Such faith seems misplaced in
93. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFsrRA L. REv. 641, 643 0980).
94. See, e.g., Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailtyto RationalActom A Critique of
ClassicalLaw andEconomics, 65 CHi-KENT L. REv. 23, 25, 35-40 (1989); Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions The Limits ofLaw and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309 0986); Leff,
supra note 14, at 470-74. See also West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in
the Moral and Political Visions ofFranz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985)
(emphasizing Kafka's insights that persons often consent to authoritarian relationships that are inconsistent with autonomy and personal growth).
95. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 14, at 474; West, supra note 94.
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the disability employment accommodation context. The rationality assumption does there appear relatively plausible with regard to many of
the larger, economically-oriented entities who will be asked under the
ADA to incur substantial expenses to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees and applicants.9 6 However, the "buyers" of
any particular accommodation are, as previously noted, the entire class
of persons who believe they may beneficially utilize or otherwise be
benefitted by the accommodation with a positive probability, as well as
those persons who ascribe positive value to the accommodation on purely
altruistic grounds. 97 It appears implausible to assume that, in a hypothetical negotiation over accommodation that would establish its
"value," the actual behavior of "buyers" would accurately reflect their
underlying self-interests, given the very small significance of any particular accommodation to almost any specific "buyer". Those self-interests
appear more likely to be subsumed by the "noise" of whatever "irrational" factors are influencing those persons at the moment of the (hypothetical) negotiations. As a result, the aggregate willingness to pay for an
accommodation that would be expressed in such a hypothetical negotiation may diverge from the sum that would be offered if all parties acted
rationally. Consequently, an accommodation judged to be efficient (and
hence imposed under the ADA if applying efficiency criteria) based upon
a proxy measure of that hypothetical aggregate willingness to pay may
not actually be wealth-maximizing. This possibility severely limits the
appeal of the efficiency standard in this context. The need for accurate
proxy measures of hypothetical behaviors to apply the efficiency criterion
is also troubling, and will be discussed more fully in Section IV.D. below.
C. The Kaldor-HicksEfficiency Criterion
In a system of perfectly competitive markets each transaction will
not only increase total wealth, but will also increase the wealth of each of
the participants to the transaction. This is an obvious corollary of the
assumption of rationality and of the fact that all market participation is
voluntary, in a sense. Therefore, when a legal rule is implemented to
cure a market failure resulting from high transaction costs, it can do so
fully only if it imposes upon the parties to the "failed" transaction not
96. Except, perhaps, to the extent that "rationality" on the part of those entities would require
that they take into account the potential subsidies that may be available from misanthropic persons
who benefit from non-accommodation of the disabled if accommodations are refused. See supra note

20.
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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only the exchange of the items involved, but also the potentially complex
structure of payments that the parties would have agreed to make had it
been possible to costlessly negotiate the transaction and exclude nonpayers.
The economic efficiency criterion with the strongest claim to normative value-though still subject to the criticisms of the efficiency orientation discussed above in IV.A. and B.-is a standard which requires that
to be regarded as efficiency-enhancing a legal rule must not only increase
aggregate wealth, but also increase the wealth of all parties affected by it.
Few if any legal rules, however, would be determined to be efficiencyenhancing under this rigorous standard, which is known as the "Pareto
improvement" criterion.9" This is so because the same substantial information and non-payer exclusion requirements that often make complex
multi-party transactions too costly to accomplish through markets, will
usually also make it prohibitively costly to design and enforce legal rules
that would determine and implement the complex payment systems
needed to charge properly all beneficiaries and compensate all persons
adversely affected, so as to replicate precisely the hypothetical failed
transactions and benefit all parties involved.
The practical uselessness of the Pareto improvement criterion as an
evaluative standard has resulted in the development and widespread
use99 of an alternative and much more relaxed criterion of economic efficiency technically known as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and more commonly known as the "potential Pareto improvement" criterion." ° A
legal rule, to satisfy this criterion, must generate aggregate benefits that
exceed total losses imposed, so that it would be possible, in theory, for
the gainers to compensate the losers sufficiently so that all affected persons benefit-a Pareto improvement-if such a compensation plan could
be costlessly implemented. It must be emphasized, however, that the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not take into account whether such theoretical compensation payments actually take place.
The use of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion rather than the Pareto improvement criterion to assess the efficiency of a law is a move which has
significant adverse implications for the normative value of any efficiency
determinations reached. Some commentators are willing to set aside
their reservations concerning the use of the willingness to pay measure of
98. POSNER, supra note 13, at 12-13.
99. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv.
1015, 1020 (1978); POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) at 92.
100. POSNER, supra note 13, at 12-13.
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value to endorse all legal rules that are efficiency-enhancing by the Pareto
improvement criterion, i.e., legal rules that cure market failures by imposing transactions which both increase aggregate wealth and increase
the wealth of all affected individuals.10 1 Laws that increase everyone's
wealth, however restrictively that term is defined, have intuitive appeal,
and one can accept Pareto improvements as valuable without having to
implicitly accept utilitarian premises which allow for interpersonal welfare comparisons. It is a significant further step, however, to embrace
laws that impose transactions which increase total wealth, but which also
create both winners and losers. It is much more problematic to conclude
that it is appropriate to impose losses on some to benefit others, without
regard to the incidence of the gains and losses, merely because the total
"value" of the gains exceeds the total "value" of the losses. Such a utilitarian approach is subject to the devastating and oft-repeated criticism
that it fails to take seriously the differences between persons. 0 2
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is an attempt to apply a measure of efficiency that is more useful for comparative evaluation of alternative legal
rules than the pristine Pareto improvement criterion which few, if any,
rules can satisfy. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion also appears to avoid having to descend into the utilitarian morass of complex and highly subjective interpersonal welfare comparisons. However, the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion does not truly avoid the interpersonal welfare comparison problem, but instead resolves it implicitly by treating a dollar of value gained
as an exact offset to a dollar of loss, regardless of the distribution of these
gains and losses across the population. In economic jargon, this is
equivalent to an acceptance of a utilitarian premise that accords primary
normative significance to the amount of total utility, and acceptance of a
further assumption of equal and constant marginal utilities of wealth
across the affected population. Some influential commentators have
found this resolution of the interpersonal welfare comparison problem to
be arbitrary and unsatisfactory, and thus reject the use of the KaldorHicks criterion as a meaningful evaluative criteria. 10 3
The responses offered to these criticisms of the premises underlying
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion by its defenders are not entirely convincing,
but are not without some intuitive appeal. One defense commonly asserted is that some explicit or implicit utilitarian standard for making
101. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 14, at 232-235. But see also West, supra note 94.
102. Kronman, supra note 14 at 232; Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A
CriticalReview ofRichardPosner's THE ECONOMIcS OF JUSTICE, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1116 (1982).
103. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 14, at 238-239.
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interpersonal welfare comparisons is a practical necessity for evaluating
the desirability of laws, and that the assumption implicit in the KaldorIicks standard that aggregate social wealth should be maximized is the
appropriate one to make in the absence of a consensus indicating otherwise, particularly if one believes that other desirable social ends will also
be enhanced by following a policy of wealth maximization. 1" A problem
with this argument is that even if one accepts the fundamental utilitarian
premises underlying the use of a total utility-based social welfare function, which many do not, it can be argued with at least as much plausibility that an assumption of declining marginal utility for all individuals is
in greater accord with popular sentiment, and that under this alternative
assumption Kaldor-Hicks efficiency would be without normative significance even to persons who accept a utilitarian framework.
A more powerful argument in favor of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
can be advanced based on the observations that all persons are affected
by a large number of laws intended to remedy various market failures,
and that each person benefits from some of these laws and is burdened by
others in essentially random fashion. Since each rule passing muster
under the Kaldor-Hicks standard increases aggregate wealth, over a
large class of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-enhancing laws having largely independent effect distributions it is statistically probable that most affected persons will be net gainers. Thus, the set of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency-enhancing laws, viewed as a single body, likely passes (or almost passes) muster even under the more stringent Pareto improvement
criterion. Therefore, the use of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion to evaluate
particular laws is justified. 105
This argument-in essence a claim that the distributional consequences of a set of wealth-enhancing laws will tend to "all even out ' ' has intuitive appeal. Although it is likely to be impossible to verify this
claim empirically, some critics who reject utilitarianism altogether in
favor of rights-based ethical standards may still contend that the potential existence of even one net loser robs the Kaldor-Hicks standard of all
normative authority."°6 This point aside, however, even if the Kaldor104. PosNER, supra note 13, at 14-15; POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE at 65-76 (1981). But
see West,supra note 94.
105. Posner, The Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOEsrRA L. REv. 487, 491-497 (1980); Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis:
A CriticalReview of RichardPosner'sTHE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1112-1113
(1982).
106. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 14, at 200; Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFSTRA L.
RnV. 641, 657-658 (1980); Polinsky, EconomicAnalysis As A PotentiallyDefective Product: A Buyer's
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Hicks criterion does endorse only aggregate Pareto improvements in the
context of repeated applications to a large set of laws, it is still not clear
that it provides a sufficient normative basis for giving approval to a particular law that may have adverse consequences for particular individuals
when those individuals have not previously expressed a willingness to
accept those losses on the basis of the "all evens out" rationale. The
question of when such consent may be reasonably implied leads into fundamental and unresolved questions of political authority that are outside
the scope of this article."0 7
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is thus revealed to have a very tenuous
normative grounding. Its claim to legitimacy is particularly weak in the
disability employment accommodation context. The allowance of a set
of undue hardship defense claims which individually and collectively satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks criteria of aggregate wealth maximization may
well impose substantial losses upon some group of disabled persons. It is
not at all obvious that the set of other Kaldor-Hicks efficient laws that
are independently implemented will collectively be sufficient to offset
those impacts, given that the losses imposed on some disabled individuals
by the set of sustained undue hardship defense claims may be as substantial as a total loss of their employment opportunities. There could be one
or more net losers whose burdens could be justified only by resort to a
total utility-based utilitarian calculus which is inconsistent with widely
shared jurisprudential attitudes concerning the ethical primacy of individual rights.
D. The Assumption of Adequate Data
The argument in favor of the economic efficiency orientation is further premised on the operational assumption that it will be possible to
establish the relevant cost and benefit magnitudes with sufficient precision to make efficiency determinations." 8 The disability employment accommodation context, however, poses very serious conceptual and
practical difficulties for such measurements.
To assess the efficiency of an activity it is necessary for each beneficiary to ascertain the value he places upon those benefits, as measured by
the sum he would be willing to pay to avoid foregoing those benefits. For
Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1655, 1680 (1974); Coleman, supra,
note 105.
107. See, eg., Coleman, supra note 105, at 1117-1131; West, supra note 106.
108. See, eg., Rizzo, supra note 106.
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each person burdened by an activity it is necessary to determine the
amount he would be willing to pay to be relieved from those burdens.
Only if the aggregate value of the benefits exceeds that of the costs can
the activity be said to be efficient even in the limited Kaldor-Hicks sense.
The relevant willingnesses to pay, of course, are those that would be evidenced by actions taken in a hypothetical costless negotiation involving
all affected parties, and not those articulated or otherwise evidenced in
another setting.
The costs of a particular accommodation to an employer can be
fairly easily established, and this cost figure would seem to generally
serve as an adequate proxy for the willingness to pay behavior that the
(presumably economically rational) employer would exhibit in a hypothetical negotiation. The measurement of the benefits of an accommodation poses far greater difficulties, however, since the class of beneficiaries
includes all persons with a perceived positive probability of benefitting
from that accommodation. This class thus would include the many disabled persons who might at some time avail themselves of a particular
accommodation, those able-bodied persons who perceive that they might
benefit as employers or customers of accommodated disabled workers, or
who subsequently become disabled in a fashion such that they themselves
may directly benefit from the accommodation, and those persons who
perceive that they would benefit on purely altruistic grounds from the
accommodation. On a conceptual level, it is not clear what behavior of
each class of those beneficiaries might serve as an adequate proxy for the
willingness to pay that they would exhibit in a hypothetical negotiation,
even assuming that they would all act rationally in such a negotiation
when, for most persons, only minuscule expected benefits are at stake. 109
On a practical level, even were it possible to define the relevant proxy
behavior, it would not be feasible to attempt to measure those benefits for
each member of this vast class of diffuse minor beneficiaries.
The economic efficiency orientation, even if accepted as valid in
principle, seems capable of practical application only in instances where
the costs and benefits of an activity are both concentrated among a relatively small group of persons, most or all of whom are significantly impacted. Otherwise, the measurement problems appear to be virtually
109. The preferences revealed through disability insurance purchases, for example, would provide information only with regard to the willingness to pay for possible future compensation for
losses resulting from disability, and not with regard to willingness to pay for employer accommodations for disabled workers.
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insurmountable.11 0 The disability employment accommodation context,
however, is one in which the benefits are exceedingly diffuse, and thus is
particularly poorly suited for application of efficiency measures.
E. Summary
The economic efficiency orientation to the implementation and evaluation of legal rules is based on a number of key premises and assumptions which appear quite problematic in the disability employment
accommodation context. First, the use of a willingness to pay measure of
value and wealth is open to severe criticism as philosophically inadequate
and insensitive to issues of distributional justice, dimensions that are here
particularly relevant. Second, the implicit assumption of rational behavior appears implausible in the context of a very large class of diffuse minor beneficiaries. Third, the conventional use of the Kaldor-Hicks rather
than the Pareto efficiency criterion requires the acceptance of highly debatable utilitarian premises. Finally, it is likely to be impossible to obtain
the data needed to make an efficiency determination in this context.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined the role that considerations of economic
efficiency should play in determining the availability of the undue hardship defense provided by the employment provisions of the newly-enacted ADA. The conclusion reached is that the text of the statute, its
legislative history, and the severe normative and operational shortcomings of the efficiency orientation in the disability employment accommodation context all indicate that efficiency concerns should be given little
or no weight by EEOC or the courts in making these determinations.
The analysis presented above in Part IV of this article, however, has
broad implications that extend well beyond the disability rights context.
It is apparent that considerations of economic efficiency play, or are at
least claimed to play, a substantial role in many administrative, legislative, and judicial decisions. It is not generally recognized by lawyers and
other non-economists how many questionable premises and dubious assumptions are implicit in the widely accepted proposition that economic
efficiency and wealth maximization are desirable social goals. Examination of these premises and assumptions in the disability employment accommodation context starkly reveals their shortcomings. Moreover, the
110. Rizzo, supranote 106 at 642; Schmalbeck, The Justice ofEconomics: An Analysis of Wealth
Maximization as a Normative Goal, 83 COLTJM. L. R~v. 488, 504-506 (1983).
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criticisms of the most crucial premises underlying the efficiency criterion- the validity of the willingness to pay theory of value and the legitimacy of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion-are quite robust, in the
sense that they apply with considerable force even when the efficiency
analysis is conducted in classic market contexts where the rationality assumption is more plausible and the cost/benefit measurement difficulties
are more tractable.
The severity of the problems inherent in the application of economic
efficiency criteria suggests that efficient resource allocation should perhaps be rejected as a valid social goal except under those highly restrictive circumstances where valuation and distributional issues are of minor
import and where Pareto improvements are possible. Such a comprehensive rejection, of course, would have economic and political significance
in that it would remove one of the primary justifications for relying heavily upon markets and simulated market mechanisms as allocative tools,
and would consequently increase the comparative appeal of non-market
allocative mechanisms. It would also vitiate one of the major justifications for social recognition of private property rights, which is that such
rights are an essential precondition for markets to function effectively. A
general repudiation of the economic efficiency orientation could lead to a
re-examination of some of the most fundamental principles of our economic and social order, with potentially far-reaching consequences.
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